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Decolonial African feminism for white allies 
 




Feminism is a word, a discourse and a political position that is frequently met with 
suspicion in African circles. There are various reasons for this distrust. Some (often those in 
disciplines that have proactively embraced decoloniality) hold that feminism is a western 
colonizing construct, which has been imposed on the country by imperialists. This response 
implicitly or explicitly accuses feminism of complicity with a colonizing agenda that desires the 
subordination of African epistemologies. Others equate a feminist political position with an 
uncritical anger and aggression towards men. They argue that, far from being antagonistic towards 
men, women need to make alliances with men in order to craft an inclusive and sustainable future 
for the African continent. In the light of these discursive and political contestations, this article 
argues that centring African feminisms is an important decolonial move. It brings to light the 
dangers of a universalizing view of African feminisms, noting that feminism in Africa, as in other 
contexts, is neither monolithic nor univocal. In this way, it aims to decolonize feminism in African 
contexts and to demonstrate that feminism has a significant role in contemporary African political 
and theoretical discourse. Finally, it suggests a response to African feminism – and African 
feminists – for white feminists based on solidarity, ally-hood and respect, arguing that such a 




Feminism and decoloniality share certain crucial points and strategies. Like feminism, 
decolonial theory protests against the internalized and normalized social and epistemological 
hierarchies that reinforce the self-proclaimed centrality of the European metropole and of 
masculinity. Although feminists in Africa, the Americas and India are united by their dislike of 
responses and meanings imposed by western scholars they are not, for that reason, automatic allies 
or in agreement about important points of gender scholarship or advocacy, as I will explain. Quite 
the opposite: difference and diversity are two key concepts of the decolonial turn, along with their 
corollaries ― particularity and specificity.  Difference is a key concept in Gilles Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition, where the philosopher comments: “Difference is not diversity. 
Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, by which the given is given 
as diverse” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 222). What Deleuze means by this is that difference is a general 
condition, a “noumenon” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 222) which pre-exists diversity and enables 
phenomena to be perceived as diverse. In post-colonial contexts, diversity manifests in terms of 
the multiple inequalities between white people’s experiences of sociality and the experiences of 
people of colour. This irreducible diversity is the foundation for this article, which explores 
African feminisms from my own point of view as a white academic living in Africa who identifies 
politically as feminist. While “white feminism” exists as an identifiable discourse, I am not writing 
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about it in this sense. Rather, I am writing about my own positionality as a racially white feminist 
living in Africa. The question that guides my discussion is, “What relationship is possible between 
a white feminist living in Africa and African feminisms?” This is not to speak for white feminists 
living in different continents, whose experiences are modulated by factors including religion, 
ethnicity, education, age and disability. I am, therefore, speaking for myself here, while hoping 
that my reflections may illuminate the complex relations between white feminists and African 
feminisms. I propose that African feminisms should be centred in discourse about feminism in 
Africa (including educational curricula). Finally, I suggest three principles for white feminists to 
adopt in relation to African feminism: solidarity, ally-hood and respect.  
 
 
What is the problem? 
Decolonial feminists are profoundly sceptical of discourses that pretend to be universal, 
such as the notions of sisterhood and a common oppression of women. They include theorists such 
as Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (1997) and Maria Lugones (2008), who critique these discourses on the 
grounds that they are, first, disingenuous and, second, false. Authors who adopt a “universal” 
approach impose a view that originates in westernized white privilege on formerly colonized 
nations and communities without declaring its origins or interests in racial and class privilege. The 
idea that two women from vastly different socio-political contexts (one white and living in the 
Global North and one black and living in the Global South) can share a common need to resist and 
ultimately overthrow patriarchy is simply not valid, due to the fact of their intersectional 
experiences of patriarchy, which interlock with their experiences of racism and class oppression. 
Unfortunately, too, white feminists, as Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak (2010) famously pointed out 
in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, have built academic careers on the backs of their research on 
women in colonized countries and women of colour. These articles tend to position white feminists 
as the saviours – morally or epistemologically – of women of colour, while denying the research 
participants a voice, agency or a defined perspective on their own life experiences. (Spivak’s essay 
was first published in 1988, but the practice of white researchers ventriloquizing the narratives and 
experiences of people of colour has not stopped.)  
Sylvia Tamale’s Introduction to African Sexualities: A Reader offers one of the best-
articulated discussions of the difficult relationship between western and African feminists. She 
argues that western feminist activists’ concern for African women whom they perceive as 
“victims” of clitoridectomy is misplaced:  
 
The bulk of approaches to the subject matter are culturally insensitive, focus 
narrowly on the negative aspects of female circumcision and completely overlook 
the multifaceted nature of the practice and the meanings attached to the rituals 
associated with it (Nnaemeka, 2005). Although African feminists do not condone 
the practice, they take strong exception to the imperialist, racist and dehumanising 
infantilisation of African women. (2011, p. 20) 
 
Tamale rightly berates European feminist scholarship for cultural insensitivity, but also notes that 
African feminists “do not condone” the practice of clitoridectomy. They focus instead on African 
women’s status as full adult human agents. Thus, Tamale avoids having to defend the practice, 
insisting instead that feminists recognise “the multifaceted nature of the practice and the meanings 
attached to the rituals associated with it”. To understand these only in terms of the dominant 
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(European, metropolitan) discourse is tantamount to “infantilisation of African women”. A dislike 
of colonial discourses about women in the Global South, and a need to put the record straight, also 
underpins Nthabiseng Motsemme’s excellent work on mothers and daughters in South African 
townships as they continue to “reclaim lives of dignity and sensuality amidst repeated negation 
and historical hardships” (2001, p. vi).  
The angry resistance of Mohanty, Spivak and other theorists to patronizing and 
condescending behaviour by white feminists is well-founded. But, to rephrase my initial research 
question: In the face of such widespread and justified anger, is it appropriate for a white feminist 
simply to keep away from African feminism and African feminist struggles? Or can a white 





The sisterhood of women, which was a staple of second-wave feminism, still has 
considerable traction in popular culture as a metaphor for connections among women.2 
Nevertheless, Mohanty points to Robin Morgan’s edited anthology Sisterhood is Global (1984) as 
exemplifying a deeply flawed attribution of  a “common condition which, despite variations in 
degree, is experienced by all human beings who are born female” (Morgan 1984, 4, cited in 
Mohanty 2003, 111, original emphasis). Mohanty rightly critiques Morgan’s elision of both race 
and privilege as part of her argument for more nuanced relationships between feminists from 
diverse racial, ethnic and socio-economic contexts. Exploding the idea of a common condition 
shared by all women is the cornerstone of my understanding of the imperative for white feminists3 
not to label themselves as the “sisters” of black feminists, or even of black women. 
It is self-evident that a white feminist cannot be a black feminist and that, although both 
may be oppressed on the basis of their gender, they will not experience their oppression in the 
same way. To be white is not only to inhabit a “white” skin, it is – more importantly ― also to 
occupy a socially constructed position of privilege (Nayak, 2007, p. 738). This is true irrespective 
of geographical location, which otherwise inflects white feminists’ experiences in unmistakable 
ways. In a post-Spivak era, white feminists must realize that, even if they experience compassion 
for women of colour, they cannot share those experiences and that it is unethical to speak for them. 
In addition, it is important for progressive white feminists to identify with racial oppression to 
understand that, despite sympathies with anti-racist struggles, white feminists remain part of the 
oppressive group and consequently are more part of the problem than of the solution. Rosemary 
Dixon explains this dilemma aptly: 
How can one be ‘sisters’ with those one oppresses? ‘Sisters’ are in the same family, 
with the same history. Shared experience leads to a way of knowing and seeing the 
world, and each other, that is itself shared. The term, then, does not hold up well 
when I try to apply it to feminism or my black ‘sisters’. (Dixon, 2002, p. 104) 
 
2 Novels such as The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants (Brashares, 2003), The Divine Secrets of the Ya-Ya 
Sisterhood (Wells, 1997) and, more recently, Young Adult fiction such as Daughters of the Stone (Llanos-Figueroa, 
2009) and She Would be King (Moore, 2018) have demonstrated that, despite sisterhood’s having been critiqued by 
decolonial feminists, it still has considerable purchase in popular writing. 
3 While “white feminism” is frequently placed within quotes to indicate its role as an identifiable discourse, I do not 
use the term here because it oversimplifies the diversity of thought among white feminists. When I write of “white 
feminists”, I am referring to individual, embodied white women who identify as feminist.  
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It is clear, then, that white feminists who share similar anti-racist concerns as black feminists must 
abandon the idea of sisterhood. Fidela Fouche, writing about the South African National Women’s 
Coalition between the 1970s and the country’s liberation from apartheid, makes a compelling case 
against appealing to sisterhood when she writes that “the stereotypes about sisterhood, which mask 
rather than transcend difference, and which mystify rather than clarify, persist” (1994, p. 79). One 
might add that the idea of sisterhood perniciously masks and invisibilises privilege. This is not to 
disparage the idea’s currency in African cultures and scholarship. For example, the Zimbabwean 
scholars Anna Chitando and Ezra Chitando write in “Weaving Sisterhood: Women African 
Theologians and Creative Writers” that “women African theologians and creative writers have 
fashioned a formidable sisterhood … [that] anticipates a new world, one where not man, but God 
reigns” (Chitando, 2005, p. 38, emphasis added). The choice of “man” to denote patriarchy as the 
dominant regime in the last sentence is no coincidence. In their article, Chitando and Chitando 
appeal to orthodox Christian understandings of humanity as a family as well as to 
communitarianism as a hallmark of African society. While sisterhood is valid in these contexts for 
creating cohesion, I remain convinced that it is not useful as a metaphor for political solidarity 
between women across the borders of race and location.  
Many theorists have pointed out that the orientation and emphases of any particular kind 
of feminist thinking will depend largely on its concept of “women”. Judith Butler famously opens 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity with an extended discussion of 
“‘Women’ as the Subject of Feminism” (2008, pp. 2-8): 
 
For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, 
understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interests 
and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political 
representation is pursued. (Butler, 2008, p. 2) 
 
Butler’s questioning of the category of “women” is of the same order as Fouche’s and Dixon’s 
questioning of the idea of sisterhood. She goes on to use Foucault’s understanding of discourse 
and power to explain how dominant discourses about gender construct and produce the subjects of 
which they speak, rather than these subjects having an inherent being outside of discourse. Using 
a social constructionist approach, Butler explains that there is no pre-existing identity or gender 
that accrues to all people who have female bodies. This means that there is no essential basis upon 
which women can be assumed to share common experiences. However, as I will argue later, the 
concepts of ally and solidarity can be useful for white feminists who share anti-racist sentiments 
with black feminists. 
 
 
Centring African feminisms 
In decolonial theory, as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o reminds us, location matters. He writes: 
“knowing oneself and one’s environment [is] the correct basis of absorbing the world” (2008, p. 
9). His collection of literary essays, Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms, 
advocates “moving the centre from its location in Europe towards a pluralism of centres, 
themselves being equally legitimate locations of the human imagination” (Thiong'o, 2008, p. 8). 
Ngũgĩ’s plea resonates with the Latin American thinker, Ramon Grosfoguel, who argues for 
moving “the locus of enunciation”, defined as the “geo-political and body-political location of the 
subject that speaks” (Grosfoguel, 2011, p. 4). The “subject that speaks”, following Foucault’s 
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logic, also assumes the power to know and to pronounce on the topic in question.4 To decolonize 
feminism is to shift the locus of enunciation from the Global North to the Global South, while 
remaining attentive to the problems associated with dividing the Aleem points out, the term “Third 
World” is outdated and patronizing, but the terms “global north” and “global south” have 
undesirable political subtexts (2015) besides being misleading. Not all countries South of the 
Equator belong to the Global South (for example, Australia is excluded on the basis of its high-
income economy) and not all countries North of the Equator belong in the Global North. In light 
of these anomalies, it is doubtful whether insisting on an essentialist division between the Global 
South and North is useful at all. Prominent decolonial thinker, Achille Mbembe, insists, in the 
closing chapter of Critique of Black Reason, on there being “only one world … composed a totality 
of a thousand parts” (2017, p. 180). In a similar vein, in an interview with Torbjørn Tumyr Nilsen, 
Mbembe argues that: “especially in the face of the kinds of ecological challenges we face, it is 
absolutely important to reinvent forms of life in common that go beyond the requisite of the nation 
state, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on” (Mbembe, Bangstad, & Nilsen, 2020). Mbembe’s 
decolonial agenda eschews hard and fast divisions, encompassing the planet and attempting to 
bring about a global adoption of reason as a faculty that will assist humans to live in more 
compassionate and sustainable ways (Mbembe, Bangstad, & Nilsen, 2020). He does not show 
similar inclusiveness towards gender, as Jeremy Weate notes: 
 
The final reason Mbembe fails to fully open his thought to thinking resistance is 
because of an unconscious gender bias that pervades and structures his text. 
Mbembe is often explicitly scathing of feminism and African feminist analyses of 
power. (Weate, 2003, p. 38) 
 
Despite Mbembe’s anti-feminist stance, his emphasis on common human challenges and powers, 
and on the global relevance of decolonisation (Mbembe, Bangstad, & Nilsen, New Frame, 2020), 
make his thinking incompatible with divisions such as North/South. On the other hand, Sabelo 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni emphasises that African epistemologies are grounded in African realities (2013, 
p. x). Ndlovu-Gatsheni also does not centre African feminism in his decolonial account of onto-
epistemology. With this in mind, I propose not to use the categories of the Global South or the 
Global North, but to limit my discussion to Africa, in order to suggest that re-centring Africa as a 
locus of enunciation is a valuable decolonial move.   
Much well-known decolonial feminism arises from India, Latin and North America, which 
has given rise to thinkers such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003), Donna Haraway (1988), 
Vandana Shiva (1989), Maria Galindo (2014) and Maria Lugones (2008). African scholars are not 
mentioned in scholarly conversations about relationships between feminisms from the Global 
North and the Global South as frequently as scholars from India and America. This is surprising, 
given that Africa was thoroughly colonized by western Europe, as Thomas Pakenham documents 
in The Scramble for Africa (1992), among other texts. Africa still bears the imprint of the colonial 
legacy in a myriad of places, practices and social relationships. Morgan Ndlovu locates the 
 
4 Wolfgang Detel perceptively lists the aspects of the relationship between power and knowledge that structure 
Foucault’s views, including: 
― which (kinds of) things are talked about; 
… 
― which forms of power are intrinsically related to the forms of language; 
― which forms of knowledge and standards of rationality are used …. (1996, p. 300) 
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domination of colonial powers over knowledge production in colonized territories in 
“‘colonization of imagination’, ‘colonization of the mind’ and colonisation of knowledge and 
power” (Ndlovu, 2018, p. 99). In the light of this, centring African feminism is an important 
decolonial move. I argue that doing this will allow us to give due weight to the relations between 
embodiment, location and theorizing; it will unseat the dominance of Euro-American feminist 
thinkers; and it will give African feminists the opportunity to contribute centrally to our 
understanding of epistemologies in the twenty-first century.  
Against notions that Africa is an undifferentiated mass of homogeneous social, economic 
and epistemic practices, African feminisms are distinguished by their diversity. Although Nancy 
Kachingwe pleads for “a feminism that will be “special to the continent” (2017), there is far from 
being one African feminism, leading scholars to discuss “African feminisms” rather than “African 
feminism”. There are too many kinds of African feminism for an exhaustive discussion of all of 
them in this article: therefore, I limit myself here to selected examples. My first example draws on 
two well-known African feminists: Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí and Molara Ogundipe-Leslie. Oyěwùmí’s 
Gender and the Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses 
(1997) maintains that Yoruba society in the author’s country of origin (Nigeria) did not practise 
“gendering” male or female subjects prior to colonization. By contrast, only three years earlier, 
Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, another Nigerian feminist, wrote that in Africa “Wifehood in itself [in 
precolonial Nigeria] was a gender, not a sex or biological role (gender being a socially constructed 
identity)” (1994, p. 14). She holds that African women come off worst under patriarchy  (Olaopa, 
2016). Both Oyěwùmí and Ogundipe-Leslie are highly mistrustful of the symbolic order of western 
thought, which imposes binary divisions onto thinking, opposing women and men, children and 
elders, nature and culture, and so on. Yet they arrive at very different conclusions about women in 
Nigeria: Oyěwùmí holds that the Yoruba did not experience social divisions along gendered lines, 
while Ogundipe-Leslie argues that patriarchy is endemic to Africa. She proposes replacing 
“feminism”, which “seems to be a kind of red rag to the bull of African men” (Ogundipe-Leslie, 
1994, p. 229), with the word “STIWANISM”, an acronym for “Social Transformation Including 
Women in Africa”  (Stakahashi, 2017). Stiwanism focuses, not on relationships between men and 
women (antagonistic or not), but on the transformation of society. Ogundipe-Leslie’s approach is 
clearly problematic in its conciliatory agenda towards men.   
A similar impulse to differentiate African feminism from its western counterparts is seen 
in Obioma Nnaemeka’s concept of nego-feminism, which, like Oyěwùmí’s theory, also draws on 
communitarian models of social arrangement, associated with Africa. Nnaemeka defines nego-
feminism as follows: “First, nego-feminism is the feminism of negotiation; second, nego-feminism 
stands for ‘no ego’ feminism. In the foundation of shared values in many African cultures are the 
principles of negotiation, give and take, compromise, and balance” (2004, p. 377). Nnaemeka’s 
ideas are not popular, mainly because of the unfortunate connotations of the name she chose; but 
they are worth exploring in more detail since she insists on “building on the indigenous, and 
(re)claiming the third space” (2004, p. 376). In other words, nego-feminism is firmly anchored in 
the African context and draws on African epistemologies.  
Another form of feminism that has recently found some traction is Africana Melanated 
Womanism, a new extension of Clenora Hudson-Weems’s idea of Africana womanism. Africana 
womanism, according to Hudson-Weems, is “a theoretical framework that is specifically designed 
to speak to the experiences of all women of African descent in opposition to the universalizing 
Western or Euro-centric feminist canon” (Chikafa-Chipiro, 2019, p. 9). Rosemary Chikafa-Chipiro 
explains that Africana Melanated Womanism, which was also introduced by Hudson-Weems, 
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refers directly to “a deliberate racial reconfiguration on Hudson-Weems’s part to specifically speak 
to a collective of black women, black men and black children” (2019, p. 9). Africana Melanated 
Womanism is, then, a transnational form of feminism in that it is geared towards people in the 
African Diaspora as well as those currently residing in Africa.  
Akachi Ezeigbo and Naomi Nkealah’s conflict about feminism echoes the objections to 
Ogundipe-Leslie’s STIWANISM. Nkealah expresses discontent with Ezeigbo’s notion of “snail-
sense feminism”, which proposes that women adopt a snail-like approach to overcoming 
patriarchy. According to this model, an oppressed woman should be a snail, slowly and 
unobtrusively negotiating obstacles instead of confronting them. This type of feminism “rejects 
transgressive female behaviour, but rather advocates survival through acceptance and 
perseverance” (Nkealah, 2017, p. 122). This is too passive an approach for Nkealah, who proposes 
that African women should embrace the camel, rather than the snail, as a symbol of their response 
to patriarchy. The camel, she explains, possesses an imposing presence; resilience; courage; and 
can deal with harsh and inhospitable conditions. Nkealah explains that “Cameline agency is all 
about the agency of women ― the ability of oppressed women to act decisively to change their 
circumstances and regain control of their lives” (2017, p. 123). She argues vigorously that camels 
are more inspiring animal metaphors than snails for women in Africa, mentioning that Somali 
poetry uses the camel as an image of women’s beauty and endurance (Nkealah, 2017, p. 123). 
 While this section has not provided a comprehensive discussion of all kinds of African 
feminism, it has highlighted some prominent and interesting examples of African feminist 
discourse that might usefully find their way into educational curricula (including at university 
level). The diversity and range of African feminisms are enormous and researchers need to be 




Possible responses for white feminists 
Earlier in this article, I argued that white women living in Africa will not experience 
feminism in the same way as black feminists. At the same time, it is not helpful to pretend, either 
politically or intellectually, that any group of feminists does not exist. What is necessary is coequal 
dialogue within the African context between feminists from different positionalities. Here I want 
to propose three ethical principles that might guide such a dialogue: solidarity, ally-hood and 
respect. Solidarity is Mohanty’s alternative to the unsatisfactory term “sisterhood”. White 
feminists can express and experience solidarity with African feminists without negating or 
attempting to transcend the irreducible diversity of their life-worlds and life experiences. In this 
regard, Mohanty’s vision of “feminism without borders”, which acknowledges borders but also 
crosses them, encodes solidarity between feminists in diverse locations and life-worlds. It offers a 
realistic way forward for feminists, by including conflict, fractures and faultlines between them:   
 
Feminism without borders is not the same as “border-less” feminism. It 
acknowledges the fault lines, conflicts, differences, fears, and containment that 
borders represent. It acknowledges that there is no one sense of a border, that the 
lines between and through nations, races, classes, sexualities, religions, and 
disabilities, are real ― and that a feminism without borders must envision change 
and social justice work across these lines of demarcation and division. (Mohanty, 
2003, p. 2) 
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In the current socio-political conditions, it is urgent for us to acknowledge the invisible social and 
political borders between feminists of different races. Mohanty distances her understanding of 
“antiracist feminism” – s “a feminist perspective that encodes race and opposition to racism as 
central to its definition” (2003, p. 253) ― from a self-declared “border-less” feminism, which 
wants to conceal its own allegiance to systems of power and privilege. These include white 
supremacism and “capitalist patriarchy” (Eisenstein, 1979). She also argues for “feminist 
solidarity, as opposed to vague assumptions of sisterhood and images of complete identification 
with the other” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 3). In addition to this, I would like to propose that white 
feminists living in Africa can adopt the position of allies of African feminism. Allies do not 
identify with or participate in the struggles of oppressed people. At the same time, they are more 
active than mere sympathizers or people who are not prejudiced: “two characteristics … separate 
allies from low-prejudice individuals, namely allies’ desire to promote social justice actively and 
their willingness to offer support to nondominant people” (Brown, 2013, p. 2212). Being an ally 
of an oppressed group is an ethical stance, founded on respect, which will help white feminists 
living in Africa to establish rapport with African feminists. Respect forges a powerful relationship 
between respecters and those they respect. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that 
respect is “object-generated rather than wholly subject-generated” (Dillon, 2018): we respect 
others for their qualities, rather than ours. Respect is characterized by responses of careful attention 
and attributing value to those whom we respect (Dillon, 2018).  The principles of solidarity, ally-
hood and respect are all marked by holding others in esteem and value, while recognizing the 




This article has argued for a nuanced understanding of African feminism as simultaneously 
diverse and particular. It also proposes that centring African feminism is valuable in the decolonial 
project: a point that decolonial theorists such as Mbembe and Ndlovu-Gatsheni unaccountably 
ignore. African feminisms could usefully be central in decolonizing educational curricula (a role 
that is only beginning to be recognized). I have argued for dialogue between white feminists living 
in Africa and African feminists that is characterized by solidarity, ally-hood and respect. These 
principles take account of differences between feminists of different groups and allow colonial 
onto-epistemological hierarchies to be broken down. Ultimately white feminists living in Africa 
and African feminists need to grant each other the starting point of their own positionalities, but 
also to consider the ways in which they each oppose neoliberal, colonialist white supremacist 
patriarchy and how to work together.  
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